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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACTS OF THE PARTIAL LABOR MARKET
REFORMS
ZEYDANLI, Tu¼gba
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan
August 2011
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
have started to implement a host of reforms aimed at increasing mobility and
exibility in the labor market. The partial labor market reforms have been
processing to change the situation of new hires which are part of the tem-
porary workforce, but making nearly no change in the situation of existing
ones, permanent workforce. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the impacts of
the partial labor market reforms for workers under temporary and permanent
work contracts in an analytical and a descriptive framework. In the descrip-
tive framework, exicurity concept and its pathways are discussed. As a case
study, the reforms and their impacts are investigated regarding of Spain and the
Netherlands. Within the analytical framework, I propose the basic overlapping
generations (OLG) model with human capital accumulation and heterogeneous
agents. The tradeo¤ between being a temporary worker and permanent worker
depends positively on the capacity of the individual, and negatively on the rate
of return on capital, the severance payment and the negative productivity shock.
iii
There is a stepping stone e¤ect for unskilled senior labor under the condition
of existence of the transition.
JEL Codes: J41, J28, J24
Keywords: Partial Labor Market, Temporary Contracts, Flexicurity, Human
Capital Accumulation
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ÖZET
KISM·I EMEK P·IYASASI REFORMU ETK·ILER·I
ZEYDANLI, Tu¼gba
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan
A¼gustos 2011
Ekonomik ·I¸sbirli¼gi ve Kalk¬nma Örgütü (OECD) üye ülkeleri emek piyasas¬n-
daki mobiliteyi ve esnekli¼gi art¬rmay¬ hedeeyen bir dizi reformlar uygulamaya
bas¸lad¬lar. K¬smi emek piyasas¬reformlar¬geçici i¸sgücünün durumunu de¼gi¸stirirken,
kal¬c¬i¸sgücünün mevcut durumunda, neredeyse hiçbir de¼gi¸siklik yapmadan yürür-
lü¼ge girmi¸stir. Tezin amac¬, analitik ve aç¬klay¬c¬bir çerçevede, geçici ve kal¬c¬i¸s
sözles¸meleri kapsam¬nda i¸sçiler için k¬smi i¸sgücü piyasas¬reformlar¬etkilerini analiz
etmektir. Aç¬klay¬c¬çerçevede, güvenceli esneklik kavram¬ve yollar¬tart¬¸s¬ld¬. Bir
vaka çal¬¸smas¬olarak; ·Ispanya ve Hollandaya ili¸skin reformlar ve bunlar¬n etki-
leri incelendi. Analitik çerçeve, örtüs¸en nesiller (OLG) modelini insan sermayesi
birikimi ve heterojen ajanlar kullanarak öneriyor. Geçici i¸sçi ve kal¬c¬i¸sçi olmak
aras¬ndaki tradeo¤ bireyin kapasitesi üzerine olumlu ba¼gl¬d¬r, k¬dem tazminat¬ve
olumsuz verimlilik s¸oku üzerine olumsuz ba¼gl¬d¬r. Geçici i¸s gücünden kal¬c¬ i¸s
gücüne, geçi¸s varl¬¼g¬kos¸ulu alt¬nda, vas¬fs¬z k¬demli düzey i¸sçilik için bir atlama
tas¸¬etkisi vard¬r.
Anahtar Kelimeler: K¬smi ·I¸sgücü Piyasas¬, Geçici Sözles¸meler, Güvenceli Esneklik,
·Insan Sermayesi Birikimi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, the rules of the game for labor market have changed
due to globalization, technological changes, pressure on resources and rapid swings
in the international division of labor. The labor markets needed to be much more
exible to make possible adjustment for rapidly changing economic conditions. Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have im-
plemented a host of reforms aimed at increasing the exibility of the labor market
and mobilizing labor resources. The exibility has taken place by making tempo-
rary work contracts more attractive than permanent work contracts. This exibility
enables employers to have opportunities for higher productivity and protability,
improved competitiveness and greater ability to respond to uctuations of demand.
For employees, more exible work arrangements improve work-life balance, raise
their job satisfaction, increase their skills, and simplify access to the labor market
(OECD, 2006, IMF 2008 and EU, 2006).
The reform process on the other hand take place in terms of a sequence of
marginal reforms rather than radical reforms, these reforms have been processing to
change the situation of new hires which are temporary workforce but making nearly
no change the situation of existing ones, permanent workforce. In other words,
countries introduced small, albeit, signicant, changes in the regulatory framework
to increase labor market exibility only on the hiring side. Higher labor market
exibility with duality may also come at some costs such as by increased employ-
ment uncertainty for employees and lower incentives to invest in rm-specic human
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capital (Dolado, 2002).
Temporary work contracts are also named as xed term contracts (FTC), which
can be seen as short term jobs with a short duration and little or no protection.
Temporary work contracts are usually o¤ered in the entry level jobs. Permanent
work is seen as stable and long-term jobs, which benet from stringent protection
named as Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). Most EPL reforms have taken
place since the early 1980s for European countries. They attempt to increase labor
market exibility by liberalizing the use of xed-term (or temporary) contracts,
while leaving largely unchanged the legislation on permanent contracts. OECD
draw up the employment protection legislation index (EPL)(Table 1) that is based
on the strength of the legal framework governing hiring and ring. EPL has been
subject to frequent policy changes over the past twenty years. The strictness of EPL
changes from country to country and it shows the exibility of the labor market.
The report from Economists (2010) illustrates the situation of Spain, under the
title of "Easy come,easy go". The aim of 1994 reforms is to promote jobs made it
easier to hire temporary workforce and led to a sharp rise in their numbers. However,
only a small proportion of the temporary workforce move to permanent workforce
and most are laid o¤ at the end of their contract. Moreover, in 2008 nancial
crisis, Spain has experienced a harsh decrease of the share of temporary workers like
7% (The Economist, 2010). Two features of Spains jobs market share much of the
blame: the high cost of ring permanent workers, and a wage system that binds rms
to industry-wide pay deals (The Financial Times, 2010). Temporary employment
played a critical role in helping Germany in 2009 crisis, as employers were able
to quickly respond to ebbing demand by reducing payrolls and temporary work
booms in Germany. However, temporarily employed people say that the loosening
of regulations in 2003 to allow companies to hire temporary workers has created a
vast cohort of poorly paid and treated employees with lower chances of obtaining
permanent jobs. Unions are lobbying for legislative changes and raising the issue
of temporary workers at contract talks. However, for Germany, the question of
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whether a temporary, lower wage job is better than no job at all (The Financial
Times, 2011). According to The German Federal Agency study, the temporary
employment agencies hire a large proportion of those jobless people, many of whom
lack training which draws two-thirds of its new employees from the ranks of the
unemployed.
Nevertheless, it is still an open question whether the benets of the labor market
exibility outweigh its costs. This thesis at rst explains the labor market reforms
and gives the descriptive analysis of duality of the labor market -temporary and
permanent workforce- in the OECD countries. Next, it proposes an overlapping
generations model for answering the question that the thesis seek.
The theoretical literature is commonly based on matching model that adopts to
regulations for both temporary and permanent workers (Blanchard and Laundier,
2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Cahuc and Zylberberg,2004). Model regula-
tions for the two types of contracts are di¤erent from each other in terms of ring
costs and the life time expected utility of risk-neutral workers is a function of their
instantaneous utility in di¤erent labor market status and of the probabilities of mov-
ing across them. In this set up, Blanchard and Laundier (2002) gure out that this
partial reform might create high turnover in the entry level job but lead to higher
unemployment. Even if unemployment rate falls, workers will be worse o¤ by work-
ing entry level jobs or many spells of unemployment before obtaining a regular job.
Moreover, they claim that young worker will be better o¤ if he is unemployed rather
than having a temporary job. Cahuc and Vinay (2002) nd out that more exible
regulation on temporary contracts actually destroys jobs, increases unemployment
and reduces aggregate welfare especially when ring costs are high. They just eval-
uate the welfare impact of labor market exibility under the reform of liberalizing
the use of xed-term contracts, while leaving largely unchanged the legislation on
permanent contracts. Modesto (2004) examines the e¤ects of ring costs under an
OLG framework and concludes that ring costs increase youth unemployment and
decrease old age unemployment. Freeman (2005) studies the e¤ects of these reforms
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on labor market performance, but nothing is revealed on the welfare consequences
for the employed.
In the empirical framework, Blanchard and Laundier (2002) try to evaluate the
welfare e¤ects of the introduction of xed term contracts in France. They construct
a measure of the average expected present value of utility using the available in-
formation on income and transition probabilities across di¤erent states. There is
some evidence on the e¤ect of temporary work contracts demonstrating that the
welfare of young workers appear to be negative. Wasmer (2006) nds that employ-
ment protection (for permanent workers) is positively correlated with job stress and
concludes stricter legal protection reduces workerswellbeing. Booth (et al.2002)
use the data from British Household Panel Survey, even if temporary workers re-
port lower level of job satisfaction, receive less work-related training and are less
well-paid than their counterparts in permanent employment, there is evidence that
xed term contracts are a stepping stone to permanent work. Women who start
in xed-term employment and move to permanent jobs fully catch up to those who
start in permanent jobs.
In the literature, there is a limited study on the impact of the partial labor
market reform for junior and senior worker under exible labor market. Moreover,
these studies only take into account the reform on ring costs while commenting on
the welfare consequences of the agent. I also consider the human capital accumula-
tion for the youth agent and comment on the situation of the worker under di¤erent
type of contracts.
The thesis has two objectives; rst objective to discuss pros and cons of the
partial labor market reform, understand exicurity and its pathways, nally within
this objective to investigate the Spanish and Dutch reforms and their impacts to
the labor market. The second objective is to answer the questions of the thesis seek
Is there any stepping stone e¤ect under this partial labor market reform for un-
skilled senior worker?", "What is the tradeo¤between being temporary employment
and permanent employment?", "What is the optimal level of human capital accu-
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mulation for the transition?", "What are the wage levels of the junior and senior
workers?". To investigate these questions, I set up the basic overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) model with human capital accumulation and heterogeneous agents.
The OLG framework enables the system to keep track of the education decision of
junior worker and itse¤ects when he is senior.
In the descriptive analysis, from reports of OECD, IMF and EU commission and
literature review, one can conclude that the exicurity would allow temporary jobs to
function better as stepping stones into permanent jobs, rather than as traps. In the
analytical framework, the model implication yields that the tradeo¤ between being
a temporary worker and permanent worker depends positively on the capacity of the
individual, and negatively on the rate of return on capital, the severance payment
and the negative productivity shock. Moreover, there is a stepping stone e¤ect for
unskilled senior worker under the condition of existence of the transition.
The thesis is organized in the following way. In the chapter 2, the descriptive
analysis of the partial labor market reform is presented. The chapter 3 discusses the
feature and impacts of the model. The chapter 4 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
PARTIAL LABOR MARKET REFORM
Since the 1980s, OECD countries have taken an action to exibilize the labor
market for adapting the changing economic conditions quickly and easily. Nonethe-
less, the impact of the partial labor market reform changes from country to country;
in other words pros and cons always existed regarding of employing reforms and
employment challenges that countries face. European Commission features the ex-
icurity pathways that the country is needed to implement exibility and security,
which is the sole way to have the exible labor market. Each country has to nd
its own concept of "exicurity" using a distinct combination of instruments that t
the national institutional, social and civic context. The Netherlands and Spain are
the countries who put so much e¤ort to decrease the rigidities in the labor market
with the aim of overcoming the various labor market challenges.
The chapter is devoted to investigate the reforms that countries conduct and
their implication to the labor market. The rst section gives a brief descriptive
analysis about pros and cons of the partial labor market reforms. The second section
describes the exicurity and its pathways, suggestion by the European Commission.
The last two sections investigate the implementation of reforms and result as a case
study for the Netherlands and Spain.
2.1 Impacts of the Partial Labor Market Reforms
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After the European Employment Strategy in 1997, European countries have in-
creasingly implemented a host of reforms so as to increase the exibility of the labor
market and mobilizing labor resources. Various labor market initiatives and reforms
have taken place which could qualify as exicurity strategies; i.e. they have taken
an integrative view of exibility and security. Countries have applied own reforms
to make exicurity reforms by taking considerations on their institutional structure
and labor market di¢ culties. However, the reform process has been characterized by
a sequence of marginal reforms rather than focusing on few radical changes. Saint
Paul (2002) and Boeri (2003) claim that the process of these reforms has conrmed
the view that marginal reforms are subjected to change the situation of temporary
workforce while maintaining status-quo of the permanent workforce.
In order to make a quick adjustment for changing economic conditions, the coun-
try should increase the labor market mobility, one option that countries use mostly is
to enable to enter and exit the workforce easily. The framework of the reforms that
Spanish government conducts tend to limit the applicability of FTC and created
a new type of permanent contract with lowering ring costs (Güell and Petrono-
golo, 2001). Italy removed the restrictions on the use of xed term contracts and
introduced temporary agency work without modifying the rules for open ended con-
tracts. Germanys reforms included extending the maximum duration of xed term
contracts from 9 to 12 months and the restrictions on the maximum number of
contract renewals were loosened (IMF, 2009). The temporary contracts werent re-
newed in France. TC had a xed duration, from 6 to 24 months and in any case,
couldnt be renewed beyond 24 months. If the worker is kept, he or she must then
be hired on a regular contract. If the worker is not kept, he or she receives a sever-
ance payment equal to 6% of the total salary received during the life of the contract
(Blanchard and Laundier, 2002). Overall, the subsequent series of reforms in these
countries continue to increase exibility at the margin, applying only to new hires
while leaving unchanged for senior workers.
The OECD countries attempted to increase labor market exibility by making
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marginal changes in Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and liberalized the
use of temporary contracts, while leaving largely unchanged the legislation for per-
manent contracts. EPL treats di¤erently in groups of workers particularly due to
the dismissal regulations, which varies by age, gender, skill, rm size and type of
contract. Hence, it creates discrimination across workers in terms of ring costs and
wage. The IMF (2009) report indicates that 92 percent of EPL regulatory changes
did not apply to workers with permanent contracts. As a result, there has been a
partial labor market reform strategy which leads to create dual labor market.
Regarding of EPL index (Table 1), United States and Canada are the countries,
which have the most exible and Turkey has the most rigid labor market among
OECD countries. The strictness of overall contract gives a signal that the rigidity
of Turkish labor market is nearly the same from 1990 to 2008, which conrms that
there is nearly no reform process that took place aimed at increasing the exibility
of labor market. Austria, Finland, Korea, Spain and Portugal are the countries to
decrease the rigidities/strictness at most in terms of permanent contracts comparing
the years 1990 to 2008 whereas Australia, Germany and France have increased the
strictness of the permanent contracts means that the hiring and ring condition
for permanent workforce being high. One can also interpret that the transition
from permanent workforce to temporary workforce becomes more competitive, which
proves the low conversion rate (Table 6). The strictness of temporary contracts has
been decreasing at most in Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Portugal
and Greece. The higher decline in the average and the standard deviation of the
EPL for temporary contracts relative to the permanent contracts implies that an
increase in hiring exibility was applied by most countries without changing and
even increasing the protection of permanent workforce.
<INSERT TABLE 1 and TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>
An increase in hiring exibility is achieved by a large majority of countries with-
out changing signicantly the protection of permanent employed workers. Moreover,
8
rms face with signicant ring restriction which increases the use of temporary con-
tracts further. The share of temporary work contracts increase for all age groups,
especially for those with age below 39 years. In Spain (Cabrales and Hopenhayn,
1997), in Germany (Rogowski and Schöman, 1996) and in France (Blanchard and
Laundier, 2002) the use of temporary work contracts is authorized for certain groups
of workers such as young and long-term unemployed. More than one fourth of all the
young employed in Spain, Poland, Portugal, Germany and Sweden had a temporary
contract in 2009 (Table 2). The excessively high share of temporary contracts for
youth also used to screen new employees in terms of high ring costs, which also
suggests that the transition rate from permanent workforce to temporary workforce
is low (Table 6).
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
2.1.1 The pros of partial labor market reforms
For the specic segments of the workforce, the reforms successfully raise employment
rates and labor market exibility. Improving the labor marketsutilization to those
groups, i.e. women, long term unemployed, new entrants and low skilled, with low
participation rates have contributed to the positive developments in the employment
and participation rates. The higher exibility in the labor market has also increased
the cyclical uctuations of employment and participation.
Empirical evidence shows that marginal reforms contribute to increase partici-
pation over the cycle and the response of employment, especially of women. Fixed
term contracts are e¤ective stepping stones to permanent jobs for women (Booth et
al. 2000 and Clark 1996). In the European Monetary Union countries reforms have
also increased the response of employment to GDP, particularly female (Arpaia and
Mourre, 2010).
An increase in the hiring rate contributed to decrease the long term unemploy-
ment rate until 2008 among EU countries (Graph 1). However, due to the partial
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liberalization of the labor market, the decrease in the unemployment rate doesnt
necessarily lead to lower long term and structural unemployment. Therefore, after
the recession periods, like 2008, it is more likely that the long term unemployment
rate tends to increase because of the decreasing in the temporary workforce.
<INSERT GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE>
The change in the labor market behavior is visible in terms of stocks and ows
of unemployed people. Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) computed an synthetic index of
mobility across labor market states under the ten years period 1985-1995 and 1996-
2006 for eleven EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). The decline of about ve
million unemployed people from 1995 to 2007 was accompanied by an increase in
mobility across labor market status with a few exceptions, Greece, Luxembourg and
France (Graph 2).
<INSERT GRAPH 2 ABOUT HERE>
Two-tier reforms enabled to increase exibility of the labor market reform on
the hiring side via temporary contracts that can easily be terminated at expiration
of the contract. There is a positively sloped relationship between the unemploy-
ment turnover which is the sum of inows and outows and the share of temporary
contracts among young workers (Graph 3). This is consistent with the expectation
that loose EPL on both the hiring and ring side implies higher job creation and
job destruction. The di¤erence between the turnover rate such as Ireland and Spain
can be explained by the di¤erence in the proportion of young workers with xed
term contract.
<INSERT GRAPH 3 ABOUT HERE>
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2.1.2 The cons of partial labor market reforms
Beside these positive e¤ects of these two tier reforms, the duality has some costs
in terms of productivity, workerscareer progression and job security. Temporary
workforce can have less access to on-the job training and thus acquires less human
capital than permanent workforce (IMF, 2010a). Moreover, due to the high turnover
rate of temporary jobs and low conversion rates from temporary to permanent con-
tracts, may reduce the incentives to invest in rm specic human capital or on
the job training. Jimeno and Toharia (1996) studied the e¤ects of FTCs on labor
productivity and nd out with shorter employment relationships, rmsand work-
ersincentives to invest in specic human capital are reduced. Dolado and Stucchi
(2008) claimed that one third of fall in TFP in Spanish manufacturing rms during
2001-2005 due to the low transition rate. The situation a¤ects youth employment
at most since temporary contracts are widespread in the entry level jobs.
The share of temporary workers to the dependent employment has increased over
countries since 1990 and has the highest share in Spain (Graph 4), approximately
thirty percent before the Great Recession 2008-2009. Reacting to the global nancial
crisis and recession, rms revised their expected prots downward and changed their
employment policy using all possible margins of adjustment of the labor input. Thus,
the exibility of the labor market creates pervasive dual employment in the economy
which is more responsive to output changes. The share of temporary workers to the
dependent employment has increased before the Great Recession 2008-2009. Spain
and Portugal have the highest temporary workforce share among OECD countries,
which also experienced harsh decrease after the recession (observed in Graph 4).
However, other countries, which have relatively less share around 10-15 percent
stayed at their previous level or experienced a decrease approximately one percent.
The temporary workforce has been falling which does indeed explain the situation
in Spain, where employment has declined by 20 percent with the vast majority of
the job losses having occurred in the temporary workforce (IMF, 2010a). The share
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of temporary contracts declined because of decreasing the renewal rate of xed-term
contracts, especially in countries with strict EPL. For example, in Spain employment
of temporary workers declined by almost 20 percent (compared with 7 percent for
total employment); by almost 10 percent in Italy (compared with 1.5 percent); by
6 percent in France (compared with 0.3 percent); and by 2 percent in Germany
(compared with an increase of 0.4 percent in total employment).
<INSERT GRAPH 4 ABOUT HERE>
The two-tier reform system has also implied a deterioration of entry wages, which
continue over the career progression. Countries which have a higher share of tem-
porary workers tend to have more disparity in terms of wage and benets between
the permanent and temporary workforce. De la Rica (2004) found an evidence that
there exists the wage gap between temporary workers and permanent workers. In
case of Spain, permanent workers earn about 10% more than temporary for men and
5 % more for women. Moreover, generally, an increase in the share of temporary
contracts leads to increase of the wage premium of permanent workers. Bentolila
and Dolado (1994) found that an increase of 1 percentage point in the rate of tem-
porary employment raises the growth rate of permanent workerswages by about
0.3%. The temporary workforce has some di¢ culties to access to unemployment
benets when unemployed (IMF, 2010).
The dual employment should deliver benets during the recovery period as rms
would be willing to hire back people on temporary contracts rather than permanent
contracts. Even if this would be the case, there are some concerns about the longer
run fairness of the system. High turnover of xed term jobs may lead to longer
unemployment spells and skills deterioration, with negative e¤ects on unemployment
and average productivity (Blanchard and Laundier, 2002 and Cahuc and Postel
Vinay, 2002). On the other hand, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) showed that the
duality may lead to temporary employment gains at the costs of lower productivity
due to the decreasing marginal returns of labor, which is so called on honeymoon
e¤ect on job creation.
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2.2 Flexicurity
Companies need to be able to adapt their workforce to changes macroeconomic con-
ditions and recruit sta¤ with better skills match, who will be more productive and
adaptable leading to greater innovation and competitiveness. Individuals increas-
ingly need employment security rather than job security due to the fact that fewer
have the same job for life. Flexicurity is the combination of labor market exibility
and security where the former is seen to be in the exclusive interest of the employer
and the latter in the interest of the employee. European citizens are willingness
to accept the need for adoption and change. 76 % of European citizens agree that
lifetime jobs with the same employer are in the past and they consider that being
able to change easily from one job to another is a very useful opportunity to nd a
job in recent days. 88 % of Europeans are sure about regular training improves ones
job opportunities. Moreover, 72% of people believe that work contracts should be-
come more exible so as to create su¢ cient jobs (European Employment and Social
Policy, 2006).
The European Commission and the Member States have reached a consensus
that exicurity policies can be implemented across four policy components; exible
and reliable contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies,
e¤ective active labor market policies, and modern social security system. According
to the report of OECD (2006), these four components can improve employment in
terms of women, youth, older workers and long term unemployed.
Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements are done through modern labor
laws, collective agreements and work organization. Algan and Cahuc (2004) analyze
the impact of strict EPL to women, youth, older workers and long term unemployed
and nd a negative impact, in other words, they face problems of entering into the
labor market. The aim of the comprehensive lifelong learning strategies ensure bet-
ter investment in human resources which is necessary to respond to rapid change
and innovation. High participation in lifelong learning increases high employment
and decreases the duration of unemployment. High skilled labor gets benet more
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in terms of low skilled worker, workers on temporary contracts, who need the great-
est need for learning (EU, 2006). For preventing this occasion, the strategy can
be implemented by active involvement of both parties such as governments, social
partners, enterprises and individual workers. E¤ective active labor market policies
enable workers to cope with rapid change, reduce unemployment spells and ease to
transitions to new jobs. Vinay and Saint Martin (2004) claim that the e¤ective-
ness of active labor market policies is positively related to less strict EPL and have
a positive e¤ect on the feeling of security among workers. Modern social security
system provides income support (unemployment benets, pensions and healthcare),
encourage employment and facilitate labor market mobility. Good unemployment
benets, which is very necessary to o¤set negative income consequences during job
transfers. The empirical evidence of Vinay and Saint Martin (2004) suggests that
workers feel better protected by adequate unemployment benets than by strict
protection against dismissal. Overall, good unemployment benets, e¤ective active
labor market policies and dynamic labor markets increase peoples feeling of security.
Implementing these four policy components need concrete policies and regula-
tions. Thus, each country has to nd its own concept of "exicurity" using a distinct
combination of instruments that t the national institutional, social and civic con-
text. Netherlands and Denmark are the countries which successfully applied "ex-
icurity system" into the labor market. These countries proved that a exible labor
market can coexist with generous welfare system to achieve low unemployment.
Flexicurity is ultimately about security and sustainability.
2.2.1 Flexicurity Pathways
These four policy suggestions are applied by exicurity pathways in terms of notify-
ing target group and aim of the policy for each pathway. The employment, security
opportunities and options of specic groups in the labor market can be enhanced
and productivity and growth boosted.
The rst pathway is related to deal with exibility at the margin of the labor
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market. The objective of this pathway is to reduce asymmetries between standard
and non-standard contracts by promoting upward transitions in the labor market
and by integrating non-standard contracts into collective agreements, labor law,
social security and life-long learning systems. In this system, non-standard contracts
guarantee basic, however, adequate protection from the start and as the working
relationship continues, build up "full" protection. In sum, with the principle of
pro rata temporis, nonstandard contracts are treated as equal to standard contracts
(EU, 2006).
The second pathway of exicurity is to secure transitions from job to job, which
brings the "employer security" rather than "job security". Once the necessities arise,
human resource management policies and built-in contractual guarantees should
ensure new jobs within the company or outside the company. Vocational training
and a strong system of life-long learning enable to switch from inside and outside
from the companies easily. Moreover, in order to prevent unemployment, it may be
feasible to introduce individualized transition to guarantees to redundant workers,
to be borne jointly by employers, social partners and public employment services
(EU, 2006). This pathway is rather important to strengthen the internal exicurity
and enhance the employability and skills of workers.
The third pathway is to access to learning and better transitions for all types
of workers. The target groups are low skilled, older workers, women and the early
school leavers. The purpose is to prevent them from becoming long term unemployed
or excluded in other ways (EU, 2006). It recommends strengthening on the basis of
existing levels of labor market dynamism, investment in skills and R&D.
The last pathway is devoted to comprehensive social security supporting transi-
tions to regular work. The target groups are currently on social security benets and
working in the informal sector. The aim of the pathway prevents informal sector and
increases social security beneters because long term welfare depend those. Active
labor market programs and social security should o¤er su¢ cient opportunities and
incentives in terms of increased conditionality of benets, to return to work and
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facilitate this transition. Informal work can be regularized in terms of o¤ering exi-
secure contracts, lower-payroll taxes and skills perspective for these sectors (EU,
2006).
2.3 Netherlands
Netherlands is the most successful country in terms of applying exicurity pathways
among OECD countries. Notwithstanding, the reforms and developments in the
Netherlands shouldnt be taken to consider as a exicurity paradise or utopia. Like
any country, the Netherlands faced with various employment challenges and gure
out its own pathway with the necessary steps for improvement. The high level of
worker mobility supported by a low level of employment protection is a long standing
feature of the Danish labor market.
The Danish labor market model is illustrated as a "golden triangle" of exicu-
rity (Figure 1). The combination of the triangle is high mobility between jobs with
a comprehensive social safety net for the unemployed and an active labor market
policy. Every year about 25% of all employees are newcomers to the specic em-
ployers. The one thirds of the newly hired comes from unemployment or are new
entrants to the labor market (Bredgaard et. al. 2003). Mobility, which is measured
by job creation, job destruction and average tenure, is very high in the Netherlands
in an international comparison. Even if the Netherlands has one of the lowest pro-
tections among OECD countries, Danish workers have a feeling of high job security
among all subgroups of workers (Auer and Cazes, 2003). Moreover, according to
the Eurobarameter (2006), which is the survey on Europeans and Mobility, reports
that more than 70 percent of the Danish workers found that it is a good thing to
change jobs every few years. In countries like Austria, Germany and Poland, this
percentage is below 30 percent. The arrows indicate the ows of people. Netherlands
has nearly the highest share of public expenditure on active labor market policies
(ALMP) (Table 3) among OECD countries, 1 percent of GDP in 2008. The Danish
"Flexicurity model" illustrates two of the most important connection regarding of
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ALMP, the qualication and motivational e¤ect. The qualication e¤ect of ALMP
is to upgrade the skills of the participants in various programs, thus their chances
of getting a job is improved. The motivational e¤ect is to inuence the ow from
unemployment benets back to work, also those unemployed who dont actually
participate in the active measures. The indication of the success of the ALMP is
the long term unemployment rate (Table 4), in 2006, 43.8% whereas in 2008 24.8%.
<INSERT FIGURE 1, TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>
The rst pathway of reform considers "atypical" workers (part-time, casual,
xed-term, temporary agency workers, self-employed). Two laws were particularly
relevant to xed-term workers and part-time workers, the Prohibition of Discrim-
ination by Working Hours (WVOA) and the Adjustment of Working Hours Act
(WAA). These articles forbid employers to discriminate between employees in terms
of di¤erent working hours in the conditions under which those employees enter,
extend or terminate a contract of employment (EU, 2007). Contractual diversity,
including xed-term work, part-time work and agency work, is high in the Nether-
lands. In 2009, Netherlands had an employment rate 75.8 % and unemployment
rate 3.9%, compared to 64.8% and 8.3% respectively in the OECD countries (Table
5 and Table 6). Working part time is even regarded as a normal and desired type
of employment especially for women (75% in Netherlands). A signicant amount of
part-time workers reported that they voluntarily work in this type of employment
(EU, 2006).
<INSERT TABLE 5 and TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>
With regard to temporary workers, a new approach to labor market exibility
and security was adopted at the end of 1995. It contains an interrelated set of start-
ing points and proposals for modifying the dismissal protection in standard employ-
ment relationships and abolishing the permit system for temporary work agencies in
respect of their placement activities (Madsen, 2008). The percentage of employees
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with temporary contracts was 17% in 2009 (12% in OECD). In the absence of The
Foundation of Labor, the Dutch government couldnt reach a consensus regarding
of exibility and security. The Foundation of Labor is an institution, which is re-
markable for its strategies of positive sum bargaining and the pursuit of "win-win"
strategies and results for both workers and employers (EU, 2006) . On April, 1996,
with the help of Foundation employees and employers confederations prepared a
detailed agreement on exibility and security. Besides that, at the same time, the
employersorganization, the trade unions and the non-prot making employment
agency "Start" reached a collective agreement for ve years on regulating the legal
position of temporary agency workers. In 1997 and 1999, the new laws abolished,
which provides for the cancellation of permits for temporary work agencies and more
rights for exible workforce and slightly fewer rights to core-workers. Thus, these
laws are increased the use of xed-term contracts. In the temp agency sector, the
key role was played by the collective labor agreements, and concluded for the periods
of 1999-2003 and 2004-2009 (IMF, 2008).
The second and third pathway concerns the specic groups in the Netherlands,
which su¤er from unemployment at most. Regulations and policies can be imple-
mented in terms of specic groups who are vulnerable in order to strengthen the
position in the labor market. In the Netherlands, ethnic minorities and unskilled
groups have di¢ culties entering into and progressing in the labor market, older
workers have insu¢ cient transition and employment security, and the career op-
portunities of women such as pay gaps and lack of women in top management in
companies. European commission and OECD recommend to the Netherlands to
facilitate the transition from part-time to full-time work, which reduces the gender
pay gap, reducing early school-leaving, and increasing overall labor supply. In the
Dutch system of dismissal protection, for insiders it is fairly strict however more
relaxed for outsiders in the labor market. Furthermore, Dutch companies are will-
ingness to invest in skills and retraining of their older workers compared to young
workers. Right now, the Dutch government and non-governmental organizations
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try to develop the reform about a general and e¤ective system of transition and
employment security that is not limited to large rms (EU 2006, 2007 and IMF,
2008).
2.4 Spain
Various European and Latin American countries attempt to increase labor market
exibility by implementing marginal changes in EPL. These changes have taken
place through liberalizing the use of temporary contracts, while leaving largely un-
changed the legislation a¤ecting the stock of employees under permanent contracts
(Dolado, 2007). In order to examine the di¤erent e¤ects of two-tier reforms, Spain
provides a fascinating analysis that reforms are mostly based on exibility rather
than security.
In 1980, two main institutional features characterized the Spanish labor market
by the approval of "WorkersStatute (Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores)", a
high degree of employment protection against both dismissals and occupational/
geographical mobility, and the prevalence of collective bargaining for setting wages,
working hours, and other employment conditions. Temporary contracts solely used
to hire workers performing non-regular productive activities such as seasonal jobs
in agriculture or tourism and represented 10% of all contracts. Under permanent
contracts, ring costs depended on the workers seniority and on the reasons for
dismissal (Employment Action Plan, 1999).
In 1984, due to the oil price shock in the economy, the Spanish labor market
su¤ered from 20% unemployment rate, needed to exibilize the labor market. Even
if labor unions were opposed of altering the status quo, the politically feasible way of
implementing signicant EPL changes went through by liberalizing the temporary
contract, which allowed them to be used to hire employees performing on regu-
lar activities. Temporary contracts required much lower ring costs than regular
permanent contracts, and their termination could not be appealed to labor courts.
Moreover, the temporary contracts (training, under probation, xed-term proper,
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and replacement contracts) could be terminated at no cost. However, permanent
contract had a severance payment of twelve dayswages per year of service and a
maximum duration of three years within the same rm, after which the employer
had to either terminate the contract or convert it into open-ended contract (Em-
ployment Action Plan (EAP), 1999). With this reform, as indicated Graph-4, the
temporary contracts were boosted, in the early 1990s, were around 35%, which led
to a high worker turnover rate, and ended up with the low conversion rates (5% in
1994 where 18% in 1987 as indicated in Graph 5). In order to o¤set some of the
undesirable e¤ects of 1984 reform, a series of countervailing EPL reforms have taken
places in the years of 1994.
<INSERT GRAPH 4 and GRAPH 5 ABOUT HERE>
In 1994 reform, the aim is to decrease the use of xed term contracts and re-
lax the condition of ring costs under permanent contracts except some groups of
disadvantaged workers (long term unemployed workers hired by small rms, older
than 45 years old, and handicapped) (EAP,1999). As indicated in Graph 4, there
was a slight reduction in the temporary employment rate between 1995 and 1997;
the conservative government and potential gains from Spains accession to the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union pushed the employers confederation and the two major
unions to agree on a new EPL reform in 1997. The reform is related to create a
new permanent EP contract, available for the year of 2001 and entail lower sever-
ance payment. Nevertheless, this reform was also based on exibility rather than
security; therefore it created a two-tier nature again. The new contract was only
available to hire workers aged 30-44 years old with unemployment spells below one
year, which is about 40% of the labor force and 33% of the employment. The gov-
ernment made contributions in social security for rms either directly hiring workers
under new permanent contracts or converting temporary into permanent contracts.
During the rst two years of contracts used to hire youth, long term unemployed
and women (IMF, 2005).
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In 2001-2002, the time for use of new EP contract expired; however, the gov-
ernment allowed them to remain an e¤ect and extended their use to the specic
groups in order not to reduce job creation in the middle of an economic slowdown
(IMF, 2005). The extended specic groups are the workers aged 16-30 years old and
face spell of unemployment more than six months. By the mid 2000s, the share of
temporary jobs was still very high (33.5 %) nonetheless their conversion rate was
stable around 4% as Figure-4 indicated. Due to the low transition rate, in 2006,
a further EPL reform took place which reopens a window of opportunity for the
excluded group of workers, but only transitory. There was a restriction for continu-
ation of temporary contracts to the same employee. Temporary workers under new
permanent contract for the age group 31-45 could be hired until the end of 2007.
If conversions took place, then there would be tax deductions for hiring permanent
employees (EAP, 2003). Since the approval of the 2006 reform, there has been a
substantial reduction in the temporary employment rate, 34% in 2006 whereas in
2008 (before the recession) 29.4%. Therefore, one can consider the 2006 reform
mostly based on the transition from temporary to permanent workforce. However,
the conversion seemed to have been short lived, and mostly concentrated on the
time of tax deduction.
Since the 1990s to 2007, Spain had experienced an e¤ectual employment growth,
as a result of this unemployment rate had decreased from 25 % in 1990s to 8 % in
2007 (Graph 6). During the 2008 global crisis, Spain experienced a harsh increase in
unemployment among OECD countries, ended up 20 % unemployment rate. A very
high unemployment rate was among youth, particularly those between 15-24 years
old with a low level of education, and youth unemployment rate has been doubled
since the end of 2007 (Graph 7). This high level of youth unemployment in Spain
as compared to other countries reects to a high incidence of temporary contracts
among young workers. Reducing unemployment among young workers, especially
unskilled, should be the rst priority regarding of policy design in order to avoid
being discouraged workers.
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<INSERT GRAPH 6 and GRAPH 7 ABOUT HERE>
The main policy recommendations to reform the labor market in Spain are mostly
based on reducing the duality on the labor market, making the labor market more
exible, increasing the employability of the youth, improving the e¢ ciency of the
matching process. (OECD, 2010 and Sanguinetti and Wö, 2011)
2.5 Conclusion
In the case of the Netherlands, the various labor market challenges were defeated
by exicurity pathways. The share of ALMP (Table 3) is higher in the Nether-
lands among OECD countries with the low unemployment rates for these vulnerable
groups, which suggest that exicurity model is working well to master the unem-
ployment challenges. In Spain case, which is the country just consider the exibility
in the labor market to cope with high unemployment rates. The labor market en-
joys the low unemployment rates under high productivity level, however under low
productivity level, due to the lack of security, ending up with very high unemploy-
ment rate by harming long term unemployed, youth and women, in other words
temporary workers. The exicurity would allow temporary jobs to function better
as stepping stones into permanent jobs, rather than as traps.
The non-exible countries regarding of EPL index such as Mexico and Turkey,
in Turkey the long term and youth unemployment rate in 2009 25.3% whereas
24.2 and 16.7 respectively in OECD. The labor force participation rate of female
is 24.2%, the smallest rate among OECD countries. The low capacity to create
new jobs, mostly due to the high rigidity, is clearly linked to excessive labor market
regulation, with the absence of these regulations, provides incentives for informal
arrangements, which in turn hinder productivity growth. Informal rms have less
access to nance, cannot e¢ ciently participate in innovation networks and invest less
in human capital. Their productivity is therefore much lower than in fully formal
rms. Even if there are various labor market challenges, there is no share of ALMP
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to GDP as well. The urgent need for labor market reforms is to apply exicurity
pathways in Turkey. Like in Netherlands, the government and Foundation of Labor
should perform reforms together. The exicurity policies make Turkish labor market
more exible and mobile aimed at decreasing the unemployment rate and informal
economy by increasing job creation and mobility.
The next chapter focuses on the analytical side of the partial labor market reform
by using transition probabilities in an OLG setup.
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CHAPTER 3
AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
The model is set up in discrete time with time spanning from 0 to 1. At each
point in time, two generations of workers are alive. Young is assumed to be junior
workers (18-39) and old is assumed to be senior workers (40-62). Assuming that
individuals are born age 18 and die at age 62, I abstract from childhood and old
age. The complete model should include three generations in order to comment on
the welfare of the retired. However, my main concern is to check out the e¤ects of
partial labor market for working generations hence for simplicity I neglect the old
age generation. The number of individuals born at time t is Nt. At one date t,
total population includes Nt young workers and Nt 1 old workers.
In the model, there exists two assumption; all junior workers are assumed to be
temporary employed and permanent workers cant be red. Junior workers have two
option whether they devote their time further education or they devote this time to
work. Each young individual i that is born at t is endowed with one unit of time.
it is the proportion of this time devoted to further education while 1   it is the
proportion of time devoted to work and earn money. Young workers, whose educated
right now, study to improve their human capital for getting more money when
old. Other young workers are working for getting more money right now. Workers
get benet from their education during their second period of life, when reaching
seniority. This modeling choice reects the idea that the skill premium becomes
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much more important after 40 (De la Croix and Lubrano, 2009). The education
level of the workers, which is the decision of the worker and the productivity level
(A) of the economy are determined the transition of being the temporary worker to
the permanent worker.
3.1 Human Capital Accumulation
The human capital accumulation formulation is based on Lucas (1988) and De
la Croix and Lubrano (2009). The old generation has an average human capital
stock ht;;which is growing over time at a rate g along a balanced growth path.
De la Croix and Lubrano (2009) dene human capital under heterogeneous agent.
it = (
Y
it ; 
O
it) is drawn from a distribution dened over R
2
+ with mean (1,1) and a
variance covariance matrix
P
:Yit represents physical strength and working ability
when young and Oit represents intellectual capacities and ability to learn and to
make education protable when we will be old in t + 1. Human capital for young
agent is such that
hYit = 
Y
it
ht
The di¤erence in earnings across young individuals results from di¤erences in
abilities and di¤erences in the number of hours worked 1  it: A young individual
has to decide which proportion 1  it of his time he will work in order to earn
(1  it)wYitht
where w is the initial wage rate per human capital in e¢ ciency unit.
A young individual also decide which proportion of it of his time he will devote
to the education in order to increase human capital stock at time t+1 when he will
be old.
hOit+1 = 
O
it	(it)
ht
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Expected earning in t+ 1 depends on the productivity level of the economy(A)
and transition probability (r) of being temporary worker to permanent worker.
wpe = w
O
it	(it)
ht with probability 1 = r
w
¯ te
= wOit	(it)
ht with probability 2 = 1  r
w is the wage of the senior worker when he is permanent worker and w
¯
is the
wage of the temporary worker.
	 is assumed to be increasing, concave and satises boundary conditions.
lim!0	
0
() = +1
lim!1	
0
() = 0
This formulation satises these conditions which also guarantees an interior so-
lution for all agents and ensures that it is always optimal to spend a strictly positive
time span for building human capital.
	() =

1

   

The average human capital stock for the next generation is
ht+1 =
1
Nt
NtP
i=1
hit+1
Hence along a balance growth path, we know the engine of growth is human
capital, G
G =
ht+1
ht
=
1
Nt
NtP
i=1
oit	(it)
ht
ht
= 1
Nt
NtP
i=1
oit	(it)
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3.2 Income and education decisions
Individuals have to take decisions concerning investment in education (it), con-
sumption (cit) and saving (sit). Junior workers are assumed to be temporarily
employed. Young individual at time t will either consume or invest. Senior workers
type depends on the total factor productivity of the economy and their decision of
investment in education. Old individual at t + 1, they will consume and will not
save any longer; not altruistic and is therefore optimal for them to consume all their
wealth when old. With  probability, the productivity level of the economy is higher
( A) than the threshold level (A), then there exist a transition (r) from temporary
employment to permanent employment. If the productivity level of the economy is
lower (A
¯
) than the threshold level, then the worker is red. The ring cost is equal
to x percentage of the salary received during the contract. x changes from the law
of the country to country such as in France 6%, in Spain 4%.
A  A with probability 3 = 
A
¯
 A with probability 4 = 1  
All types of worker start the job as a temporary worker at period t: At period
t+ 1, if the productivity level of the economy is equal or higher than the threshold
level, with transition probability (r), temporary junior worker can be transferred
to the permanent senior worker or with probability (1  r) stayed as a temporary
which belongs to Type 1 worker. If the junior worker stays as temporary for period
t and t+1, then s/he is Type 2. If the productivity level is lower than the threshold
level, then temporary worker will be red, which we called type 3.
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Type 1 TE PE Probability
Income wYit = (1  it)wYitht wOit+1 = wOit (it)ht P (rjv)
Type 2 TE TE Probability
Income wYit = (1  it)wYitht w¯
O
it+1=w
O
it (it)
ht P ((1  r)jv)
Type 3 TE Fired Probability
Income wYit = (1  it)wYitht fcit = x((1  it)wYitht) P (1  v)
Since preferences dont depend on leisure and capital market is perfect, the
individual decision problem can be evaluated separably. I rst maximise the life-
cycle income to determine the optimal education. Secondly, I maximise utility given
income to determine optimal saving and optimal consumption.
The life cycle total income for the young generation; $it
$it = P (v)[(1  it)wYitht + P (r)P (r\v) wROit (it)ht + P (1 r)P (r\v) wROit (it)ht] + P (1 
v)[(1  it)wYitht + x((1  it)wYitht)]
Proposition 1
The life cycle total income for worker i is maximized for it satisfying
	
0
(it) = R
Yit
Oit
xP (1  v)
Proof. The rst order condition corresponds to a maximum due to the fact that
the function 	
0
(it) is concave.
This represents the trade o¤ between temporary employment and permanent
employment. The decision depends on the ratio between physical and intellectual
abilities, the total productivity level of the economy and the percentage of the
severance payment.
The agent maximizes the logarithmic utility function with respect to two budget
constraints
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wYit = c
Y
it + sit
dOit+1 = P (rjv) wOit+1 + P ((1  r)jv)w¯
O
it+1 + P (1  v)fcit +Rsit
Proposition 2
The saving locus is given by:
sit =

1+
wYit   1R(1+) [P (rjv) wOit+1 + P ((1  r)jv)w¯
O
it+1 + P (1  v)fcit]
Savings depends on positively on income when young and negatively on the
discounted income when old.
3.3 Firms
Firms produce the nal good with the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
F (Kt; Lit) = AK

t (Lit)
1 
where Kt is the stock of physical capital, Lit is the permanent and the temporary
labor input in e¢ ciency units. # belongs to the share of permanent labor and (1 #)
for temporary labor.
Lit = #
P
pe
Lit + (1  #)
P
te
Lit
 (0; 1) is related to the capital share and A is a parameter measuring total
factor productivity. Firms make contract with agents before knowing the total factor
productivity (A) of the economy. R is the return on capital between two periods;
both are constant along a BGP.
The rms objective is to maximize prot with respect to capital and labor
max  = P (v) AKt (Lit)
1  + P (1  v)A
¯
Kt #(
P
pe
Lit)
1    wYit (1  #)
P
te
Lit  
P (rjv) wOit+1#
P
pe
Lit   P ((1  r)jv)w¯
O
it+1(1  #)
P
te
Lit   P (1  v)x(wYit )(1 
#)
P
te
Lit  RKt
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The capital stock is formed by the aggregation of all savings
Kt+1 =
NtP
i=1
sit
Labor market clears
Lit =
NtP
te
(1  it) Yitht +
Nt 1P
te;pe
0it 1 (it 1)ht
Assume that capital depreciate fully after one period.
The rate of return of capital and wage rates for permanent worker and temporary
worker are given by:
R = P (v) AK 1t Lit
1  + P (1  v)A
¯
K 1t #(
P
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Lit)
1 
wOit+1 =
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 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w
¯
O
it+1 =
P (v) A(1 )Kt Lit  (1 it)wYitht P (1 v)x((1 it)wYitht)
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3.4 Equilibrium
This section provides a formal denition of the equilibrium. Hence, it is reasonable
to dene intensive variables:
w^Yi =
wYit
ht
w^Oi =
w^Ot
ht
s^i =
sit
ht
K^ = Ktht L^it =
Lit
ht
c^i =
cit
ht
d^i =
dit
ht
 A vector of individual variables
n
i; w^
Y
i ; w
^O
i ;w¯
^O
i ; s^i; d^i
o
wYi = (1  i)wY (1)
wOi = w
O
i 	(i) with P (rjv) (2)
w
¯
O
i = w
O
i 	(i) with P (1  rjv) (3)
	
0
(i) = R
Yit
Oit
xP (1  v) (4)
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si =

1 + 
(1 i)wY  1
R(1 + )
[P (rjv)wOi 	(i)+P ((1 r)jv)wOi 	(i)+P (1 v)x (1  it)wYit ]
(5)
ci =
1
1 + 
(1 i)wY+ 1
R(1 + )
[P (rjv)wOi 	(i)+P ((1 r)jv)wOi 	(i)+P (1 v)x((1  it)wYit ]
(6)
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(7)
 A vector of aggregate variables
n
G; y^; K^; L^it
o
G =
1
Nt
NtX
i=1
oi	(i) (8)
y^ = Nt 1[di + (1 + nt 1)ci] + (1 + nt 1)Nt 1si (9)
K^ =
NYX
i=1
sit
1 + g
(10)
Lit =
NYX
i=1
(1  i) Yi +
NOX
J=1
0j (j) (11)
3.5 Implication of the Model
In this section, I discuss the implications of the model regarding of education, pro-
ductivity level, wage discrimination and securitization to answer questions the thesis
seek. I also comment on how the assumptions in the model a¤ect the implications
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and how changes in the assumptions will change implication. Lastly, I evaluate
and recommend policies for the Turkish labor market, the strictest among OECD
countries.
As proposition 1 indicates, the worker choice for  depends on the capacity of
the individual, the rate of return on capital, the percentage share of the entire
salary that the worker gets when ring and the productivity level of the economy.
Since  is concave function, education is increasing in the ratio of IQ to strength,
the skilled labor has tended to invest in education more than unskilled labor, and
decreasing in the rate of return on capital, the productivity level of the economy
and percentage of the severance payment. During the expansionary period, instead
of choosing a higher level of education, individuals have more incentive to work.
Individuals prefer to work and receive higher wages while experiencing high rate of
return on capital. The higher the severance payment the agent gets the lower to
devote time to education. This conclusion can be interpreted within the periods, the
junior worker, employed as temporary, to get the higher severance payment when
becoming a senior worker, should dedicate to invest in education more. Once the
transition from temporary to permanent workforce achieved, then the worker can
shift their time education to work. Senior temporary worker need to accumulate
more on human capital to get the higher severance payment. In other words, the
ring cost depends on the education level that the workers have, which is related
with the transition mechanism.
The assumption in the model is that every agent is temporary employed at the
junior level, increases job nding rate for long term unemployed, youth and women
hence decreases the natural rate of unemployment in the economy which is consistent
with the data. For unskilled labor, the temporary workforce enables them to nd
a job easily, decreases the job nding rate, even if their abilitys low, there is still
an opportunity to join the permanent workforce but due to the absence of ability,
receive lower wages than skilled labor in junior level times. Once the transition
occurs, the demand for wage of permanent worker is independent for ability. Hence,
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there is a stepping stone e¤ect for unskilled senior labor under the condition of
existence of the transition. However, the high incidence of temporary contracts
among better educated young cohorts is often detrimental for returns to education
due to the frequent underutilization of skills.
In the partial labor market reform, the state of the temporary workforce mostly
depends on the productivity level of the economy. Mostly rms and workers are
making contracts before knowing the productivity shocks; the transition from tem-
porary to permanent workforce depends on both the education level of the worker
and the productivity level of the economy. If the expectation is based on positive
productivity in the economy, then the junior temporary worker devotes his time to
work and earn higher wages. Since there is a positive productivity, the chance of
the worker gets red is lower. However, if the worker doesnt achieve the optimal 
level, then the transition doesnt occur and stays as temporary. If the expectation is
based on negative productivity shocks, the junior worker should devote his time to
education in order not to get red. In the negative productivity shock, the chance
of ring the temporary worker increases and the conversion rate is less as we have
seen data as well. If one consider the saving locus, in two period overlapping genera-
tions model, which depends on the wage of the junior worker and senior worker. As
proposition 3 indicates, the wage level of the worker type depends on the productiv-
ity level of the economy. If the economy ends up with the low productivity level, the
disparity between the wage level of the workers get larger. The saving locus, which
roughly is the welfare of the agent in the OLG model, is associated with the wage
level. Hence, the duality in the wage level reects the welfare of the agent directly.
Once the economy hit by the recession, the income gap between agents increase,
which leads more disparity in the economy.
The securitization is absent in the model, exibility is achieved by the heteroge-
nous agent. If we add security to the model as a further work, we have to dene
the intermediaries, which is the connection between employee, employer and gov-
ernment. The cost of securitization is on government, employer and employee. This
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can be decreased the wage of worker, however it denitely increases the transition
rate, which reects the decent work. This mechanism also enables vulnerable group,
who is older workers and unskilled workers, to boost their welfare.
The assumption, all junior workers are temporary employed, the model lacks of
unemployment, and however the main concern is the condition of temporary and
permanent workforce. This assumption deals with this particular and vulnerable
group, who has the large share in temporary workforce. Hence, the model tries
to measure whether there is any stepping stone e¤ect on vulnerable group, which
are long term unemployed people, youth, women and unskilled, in their seniority.
The full employment assumption is never realistic however in order to measure the
impact of temporary employment, the transition, need this assumption. Without
the full employment assumption, one can also consider the change in the level of
unemployment rate as well. The better way to analyze this is employing search and
matching model in the rm side and overlapping generations model in the consumer
side.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In the last three decades, the rules of labor market were deregulated to adapt the
changing macroeconomic conditions quickly and easily. Countries have started to
implement a host of reforms with the initial aim to increase mobility and exibility in
the labor market which boost the productivity in the economy. The most popular
reform, which in the literature called the partial labor market reform, have been
processing to change the situation of new hires which are temporary workforce but
making nearly no change the situation of existing ones, permanent workforce. The
aim of the thesis was to analyze and propose the model for the impacts of the partial
labor market reforms for junior and senior workers under temporary and permanent
work contracts in a descriptive framework and an analytical framework.
In the descriptive framework, the thesis investigated the benets and costs of
the impact of the partial labor market reform, then examining the exicurity and
its pathways, which was the suggestion of the EU commission to countries to have
the exible labor market. As a case study, the thesis started exploring two countries
regarding of implementation of reforms and the situation of the labor market, the
Netherlands and Spain. The Netherlands and Spain faced with the various employ-
ment challenges and overcame these problems in a di¤erent way. The Netherlands
applied the exicurity pathway to have the exible labor market and incredibly suc-
cessful of conducting the reforms. The reform of Spain, on the other hand, subjected
to a marginal changes on the contracts rather than radical changes. The partial re-
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forms performed in a good manner until 2008 recession. Within and after the crisis,
Spain still has su¤ered from high unemployment rate, 20%, the same rate before
implementing the reforms.
In the analytical framework, the thesis o¤ered the model for investigating the
impacts of the partial labor market reforms for junior and senior workers under
temporary and permanent work contracts. The model set up the basic overlap-
ping generations (OLG) model with human capital accumulation and heterogeneous
agents. The transition from temporary workforce to permanent workforce depends
on the optimal level of education and the total factor productivity in the economy.
The e¤ects of productivity shock investigated via expectations of the agent. The
optimal level of education depends positively on the capacity of the individual, and
negatively on the rate of return on capital, the severance payment and the negative
productivity shock. Once the transition from temporary workforce to permanent
workforce occurs, the demand for wage of permanent worker is independent for abil-
ity. Hence, there is a stepping stone e¤ect for unskilled labor under the condition
of existence of the transition. However, the high incidence of temporary contracts
among better educated young cohorts is often detrimental for returns to education
due to the frequent underutilization.
As a nal word, the exicurity would allow temporary jobs to function better
as stepping stones into permanent jobs, rather than as traps. The rigid countries
immediately implement the reforms related with the exibility and security. The
countries, conducting the partial labor market, should be able to adapt security
reforms to protect their temporary workforce under the low productivity level.
For further work, several changes will be made with regard to the modelization.
Securitization framework can be added in the model or the rm side of the model
can be considered under search and matching model.
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